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Common Law Liability of the
Certified Public Accountant for
Negligent Misrepresentation
HOWARD B. WIENER*
The scope of the duty owed by the accountant for negligent mis-
representation has traditionally been limited to those with whom
he is in privity pursuant to the rationale described by Judge Car-
dozo in Ultramares v. Touche. This article questions that ration-
ale and suggests that social, economic and legal considerations
now require accountants to be judged by the same standards ap-
plied to other professionals.
INTRODUCTION
This article---"Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Ac-
countant for Negligent Misrepresentation" or "Ultramares Revis-
ited"-was prompted by my exposure to an appeal in a
coordinated proceeding involving twenty-three plaintiffs who suc-
cessfully sued Touche Ross & Co. (Touche), a national firm of cer-
tified public accountants, for negligent misrepresentation,
obtaining judgments for about $26,800,000.' The details of the in-
* Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division
One. A.B., Brown University, 1952; LL.B., Harvard University, 1955; LL.M., Univer-
sity of Virginia, 1982. The original of this article, prepared with the helpful gui-
dance of Professor John Hetherington of the University of Virginia Law School,
was submitted in April 1982 as a Master's thesis for the Master of Laws in the Ju-
dicial Process program. The present article reflects the critiquing, editing and ana-
lytical skills of my former research lawyer, William S. Dato, whose invaluable
assistance has substantially improved the original product.
1. Swiss Bank Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co., Civ. No. 18057 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th
Dist., stipulated reversal June 1980) (Coordination Proceeding Special Title, Rule
1550(b)) (commonly referred to as the U.S. Financial case). Following oral argu-
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tricate financial machinations of U.S. Financial, a San Diego-
based real estate conglomerate, and the relationship and ultimate
liability of Touche were presented to a jury in a nine-month trial
which included 900 exhibits, 75 witnesses and 18,000 pages of tran-
script. (For the interested reader, an abbreviated and generalized
statement of the facts of the U.S. Financial case is set out in the
Appendix.2 ) Although the trial, in typical southern California
style, was probably more grandiose than the usual case, I believe
it fair to assume that as a combined result of creative litigators,
"deep pockets" and expanded theories of tort liability in our in-
creasingly complex financial world, similar scenarios with like
characters bearing different names have been, are, and will be
playing to packed houses across the country.3 Regardless of the
ment and submission of the case for decision, counsel for all parties advised the
court that the case had been settled. Terms of the settlement were not disclosed;
accordingly, the court neither prepared nor filed an opinion. To the extent that
views are expressed in the following pages, those views are solely my own and
may not be attributed to the court nor panel which heard oral argument.
2. Although not essential to an understanding of the legal issues, these facts
permit a fuller appreciation of the difficulties involved in devising a simple
formula to resolve the problems which can arise in an almost infinite number of
commercial situations.
3. This broad statement unsupported by independent social scientific re-
search is reflected time and again in the footnotes which abound in the myriad of
articles written on this subject. See, e.g., Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach
to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON IA. I REv. 507, 507 n.2
(1976):
There has been a significant rise in the number of lawsuits brought
against accountants in the past decade [1966-1976]. In 1966 it was reported
that approximately 100 suits were in various stages of litigation. Wall St.
J., Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6, at 13, col. 2. By 1973, 'more than 500 companies
ha[d] litigation or claims in process involving auditors.' Hawes, Truth in
Financial Statements: An Introduction, 28 VANmD. L REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1975).
Recently The New York Times reported that about 300 suits were in pro-
gress against less than twelve of the largest domestic accounting firms.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1975, § 3, at 14, col. 8. It has also been estimated that
over two hundred claims are pending against the smaller firms. See Grif-
fin, The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B_.A J.
759, 759 (1976).
See also Mess, Accountants and The Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52
NoTRE DAmE LAw., 838 (1977): "'Professions once seemingly inviolate from litiga-
tion are no longer sacrosanct. The age old axiom that physicians bury their mis-
takes, while attorneys and accountants file theirs away has little relevance in
modern-day America." Id. at 838 n.1 (citing Eizenstat & Speer, Accountants' Pro-
fessional Liability: Expanding Exposure, 22 FED. INs. CouNs. Q. 7 (1972)). As re-
cently as December 28, 1981, the legal newspaper, The Los Angeles Daily Journal,
carried the news item that attorneys' fees of $1,180,000 were awarded to counsel
for plaintiffs in Litowitz v. Arthur Andersen & Co. for their services in arranging a
settlement fund of about $6,000,000 in a class action. One of the settling defend-
ants was the national accounting firm of Arthur Andersen & Co., charged with
making omissions in financial statements of bankrupt Frigitemp Corporation in vi-
olation of the federal securities laws. L.A. Daily J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
It should come as no surprise that the bulk of reported cases against account-
ants are those against the "Big Eight" who perform the audits for about 80 percent
of the publicly held companies in the United States. These firms are: Peat,
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cause, consumer awareness or commercial greed, it is only to
have been expected that when the accountant became high
priest4 willing for a fee to translate, through the added mystique
of computer software, the jargon of almost incomprehensible
financial transactions into neat, tabulated and word-processed
form, he became targeted as the prime defendant when the pub-
licly held corporation he audited became bankruptB
A convenient and perhaps essential starting point for any dis-
cussion of the scope of the accountant's liability is Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche.6 There, defendants, a firm of certified public ac-
countants employed by Fred Stern & Co., Inc. to conduct an an-
nual audit negligently overvalued the assets of the company.
Plaintiff, who had loaned money in reliance upon the certified bal-
ance sheet supplied by Stern, successfully sued Touche. On ap-
peal Judge Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous court, absolved the
accountants by saying
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may ex-
pose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
Marwick & Mitchell Co.; Arthur Andersen & Co.; Ernst & Ernst; Price Waterhouse
& Co.; Haskins & Sells; Lybrand Bros.; Touche, Ross & Co.; and Arthur Young & Co.
See Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of the
Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 680 n.25 (1971). The smaller accounting firm, however,
is not free from litigation for statistically there has been an increase in suits
against these firms as welL Dickenson, The C.P.A.'s Dilemma-Myths and Reali-
ties, CAl. C.P.A. Q., Mar. 1977, at 12.
4. This perceived status of the accountant may well be due to the account-
ants' self-fulfilling prophecy. In discussing developments in Accounting & Audit-
ing Standards established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and
Committees of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
one speaker explained that accountants 'Just have to assume that the average lay-
man cannot comprehend them [financial statements] and that, like the mysteries
of ancient Egypt, you need an elite priesthood to define and interpret what ap-
pears in the financial statements." Stanger, Developments in the Conceptual
Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting, and Their Impact Upon Le-
gal Considerations, 33 Bus. LAW. 2447, 2448 (1978).
5. The mysteries of finance are not, of course, reserved to non-accountants
who may have both the intellectual and emotional need for accounting guidance.
Even those charged with the financial planning for this country confess in rare,
but probably truthful moments that "[n]one of us really understands what's going
on with all these numbers ... ." Grieder, The Education of David Stockman,
An., Dec. 1981, at 38. When the Director of the Office of Management & Budget
admits that figures which have passed the scrutiny of select committees and staff
of the Congress are still unintelligible, the vehemence of the aggrieved creditor to-
ward the accountant, generally the only surviving and solvent remnant of the
debtor, becomes more understandable.
6. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.
7
Whether due to the compelling logic of the holding,8 the status of
Cardozo,9 concern for the fledgling profession of accountancy,lO or
a combination of each, the Ultramares holding remained intact for
many years in every jurisdiction where the issue was raised.
Only comparatively recently has there been a fresh look at the
problem free from the gloss of Cardozo hyperbole with a rejection
of privity as a necessary element.
This article will first briefly review accounting standards gov-
erning accountants in performing a certified audit; second, take a
closer look at Ultramares, its progeny and those cases rejecting it;
and third, inquire into the present validity of the policy considera-
tions upon which Ultramares is based. It concludes by suggesting
an alternative analytic approach more consistent with the devel-
opment of tort law in other fields, that is, that absent defined ex-
ternal policy considerations, the accountant be held liable for any
reasonably foreseeable harm caused by his negligence."'
7. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
8. One "probable reason" given for the "continued viability of the privity de-
fense in the area of accountants' liability is the strength of the practical argu-
ments supporting the Ultramares decision." Comment, supra note 3, at 679
(emphasis added).
9. Awe for Cardozo has been advanced by more than one commentator as the
reason for the viability of Ultramares. See Shugrue, Auditing the Auditors, 13
TRIAL 31 (1977). Professor Seavey has not been shy in criticizing Cardozo opinions
and flushing out areas where Cardozo's parade of horribles really amounts to an
overstatement, probably unnecessary to his holding. See Seavey, Mr. Justice Car-
dozo and The Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372, 400 (1939).
10. Referring to the fact that in 1960 when the "Big Eight" grossed over $200
million, it has been said that "in the light of the economic maturation of the in-
dependent accounting profession, . . . dependence on ... judicial solicitude
seems ill-advised." Bradley, Auditors Liability and the Increased Need for Ac-
counting Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 898, 921 (1965). By 1981, gross
revenues for the top eight firms had increased to well over $6 billion. Wayne, The
Year of the Accountant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1982, § 3, at 1. See generally SuBcom.
ON REPORTS, AccoumNING, AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS, THE AcCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT, S. Doc. No. 34, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT]. Interestingly,
although Cardozo deferred to the legislature to create what he described as a "rev-
olutionary change" in permitting liability of accountants without the need for priv-
ity, no state legislature has done so. No effort will be made here to answer
whether the absence of state legislation reflects the extent of the problem or
merely the presence of political muscle by the accounting profession.
11. As noted in the preceding footnote, the discussion which follows is re-
stricted to judicial analysis. There is presently no state legislation limited solely
to the tort liability of the accountant. Presumably, no crisis comparable to the
medical malpractice crisis has arisen or been orchestrated.
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STANDARDS GOVERNING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN AUDIT
Ready access to relevant information on a company's financial
status is not only essential to that company's business planning,
but necessary for other persons interested in the company.
Whether those persons are in the private sector (current or pro-
spective shareholders, institutional lenders or small private credi-
tors) or in the public sector (the Internal Revenue Service),
accurate financial statements reflecting the company's financial
condition and results of operations at a given point in time are re-
quired. Thus, in the ordinary course of business a company must
prepare financial statements. In this sense, the preparation of
those statements is not the job of outside auditors. However, it is
the function of those auditors to evaluate the financial statements
in order to express a professional opinion on them following an
audit.
For accounting purposes, "audit" is a term of art. The ultimate
objective of an audit is to express an opinion on the fairness with
which the financial statements "present financial position, results
of operations, and changes in financial position in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles.' 2 The report by the
auditor is the way "he expresses his opinion or, if circumstances
require, disclaims an opinion. In either case, he states whether
his examination has been made in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards (GAAS). These standards require him
to state whether, in his opinion, the financial statements are
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP) and whether such principles have been consist-
ently applied in the preparation of the financial statements of the
current period in relation to those of the preceding period."'3
The accountant's report normally forms the basis for any asser-
tion of liability against him. Statements on Auditing Standards,
promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA), govern the preparation of these reports as
well as other aspects of the accountant's work.14 The reporting
standards provide as follows:
12. 1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, PROFESSIONAL STAN-
DARDS, AU § 110.01 (1980) [hereinafter cited as AICPA].
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. The AICPA standards also provide general guidelines and regulate the
conduct of field Work
General Standards
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently
observed in the current period in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded
as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the
financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that
an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be
expressed, the reasons therefor should be stated. In all cases where
an auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the report
should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's
examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.15
The objective of the fourth standard of reporting is to prevent
misrepresentation of the degree of responsibility the auditor is as-
suming when his name is associated with financial statements. 6
When the accountant expresses an unqualified opinion he is say-
ing that the financial statements fairly present financial position;
GAAP, with adequate disclosure, has consistently been applied to
the results of operations and changes in financial position.17 This
conclusion may be expressed only when the auditor has formed
such an opinion on the basis of an examination made in accord-
ance with GAAS. When the auditor is of the opinion that the
financial statements do not present fairly the financial position in
conformity with GAAP, an adverse opinion is required.18
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having ad-
equate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental
attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the ex-
amination and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be
properly supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the
resultant extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be
restricted.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through in-
spection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reason-
able basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
examination.
Id. AU § 150.02.
15. Id.
16. Id. AU § 509.05.
17. Id. AU § 509.28.
18. Id. AU § 509.41. When the auditor expresses an adverse opinion, he should
disclose in a separate paragraph(s) of his report: (a) all the substantive reasons
for his adverse opinion; and (b) the principal effects of the subject matter of the
adverse opinion on financial position, results of operations and changes in
financial position, if reasonably determinable. If the effects are not reasonably de-
terminable, the report should so state. The report also should state any reserva-
tions the auditor has regarding fair presentation in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles other than those giving rise to the adverse opinion.
Id. AU § 509.42. Many states, including California, have regulations governing the
[voL. 20: 233, 1983] Accountant Liability
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These encompassing, self-regulatory principles, standards and
procedures promulgated by the accounting profession itself were
not of instant creation.19 They were the amalgam of a number of
forces.
Starting about the tim-e Ultramares was decided, accelerating
political, social and economic factors contributed to regulatory
control. The accumulation of vast amounts of capital by commer-
procedure and content of accountant's reports comparable to standards promul-
gated by AICPA. See, e.g., CAI. ADIAN. CODE tit. 16, § 58.1 (1980), adopted by the
State Board of Accountancy pursuant to CAi. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5010, 5018
(West 1974).
19. Compliance with GAAP does not necessarily immunize the accountant
from liability. In a criminal suit, United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970), the jury was properly told of the defend-
ants' contention that they acted honestly and in good faith in accordance with
GAAS and GAAP.
Proof of compliance with generally accepted standards was "evidence
which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he ac-
ted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were not materially false
or misleading." "Te weight and credibility extended by you to such
proof, and its persuasiveness, must depend, among other things, on how
authoritative you find the precedents and the teachings relied upon by the
parties to be, the extent to which they contemplate, deal with, and apply
to the type of circumstances found by you to have existed here, and the
weight you give the expert opinion evidence offered by the parties. That
may depend on the credibility extended by you to expert witnesses, the
definiteness with which they testified, the reasons given for their opinions,
and all the other facts affecting credibility ......
425 F.2d at 805-06 (quoting the jury instructions). The critical test, therefore, was
"whether the financial statement as a whole 'fairly presented the financial condi-
tion of Continental as of September 30, 1962 and whether it accurately reported
the operations for fiscal 1962." Id. at 805 (quoting the jury instructions). A simi-
lar statement appears in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 112,121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976), where the accountants were sued under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act for violating rule 10(b)-5. "Much has been said by the parties about
generally accepted accounting principles and the proper way for an accountant to
report real estate transactions. We think this misses the point. Our inquiry is
properly focused not on whether Laventhol's report satisfies esoteric accounting
norms, comprehensible only to the initiate, but whether the report fairly presents
the true financial position of Firestone, as of November 30, 1969, to the untutored
eye of an ordinary investor." See also Thor Power Tool Co. v. C.LR., 439 U.S. 522
(1979). Whatever the scope of the duty, it is now clear the accountant can no
longer be sanguine as to the absence of liability because he complied with GAAP
and performed his audit in accordance with GAAS. Comment, Thor Power Tool
Co. v. C.IR. Further Erodes C.P.A.'s Defense of Observing Professional Standards,
19 Am. Bus. L.J. 87, 96 (1981). Nor can the accountant rest comfortably, free from
anxiety about the possibility of imposition of discipline under the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 2(e). In performing its regulatory function the
SEC does not always agree with the judgments exercised by independent audi-
tors. Chazen & Ten Eyck, Lessons to be Learned from Rule 2(e) Proceedings, FIN.
ExEcuTrVE, July 1981, at 19.
cial enterprises through increased public ownership of these com-
panies, combined with greater governmental involvement due to
dramatic economic and political failures, brought about changes
in both the role and control of the accountant.20 The use of capi-
tal from large numbers of outside investors not only altered the
financial scene by requiring greater disclosure by management
but, capturing the insatiable capitalistic appetite of many who
had otherwise managed to escape the allure of Wall Street, con-
tributed greatly to the stock market crash of 1929. That crash,
sparking severe criticism of accounting practices by Congress,
was one of the reasons for the passage of the federal securities
laws in 1933 and 1934.21 The Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC), created in 1934 to maintain and enforce compliance with
the securities laws,22 has thus far remained satisfied that investor
protection is assured when the accounting profession remains es-
sentially autonomous, setting its own accounting rules and stan-
dards subject to SEC oversight.2 3
To suggest that Congress and/or any of its watchdog commis-
sions acted with speed in response to this crisis, however, is inac-
curate. Not until 1940 did the SEC issue what now appears to
have been long overdue, Accounting Series Release No. 19 in the
McKesson & Robbins case,24 criticizing the accountants for inac-
curacies in the corporation's audited financial statements. The
SEC recommended in part that the accounting profession take
physical inventories and verify accounts and notes receivable in
an audit. The auditing standards referred to earlier 25 were
adopted by AICPA in response to these recommendations.
More recently, financial upheaval in the form of "Equity Fund-
20. See generally J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE AcCOUNTING PROFESSION (1969).
21. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934); see Gruenbaum and Steinberg, Accountants' Lia-
bility and Responsibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 247 (1980).
22. Accountants may be liable under the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i (1976). Section 11 imposes liability for material misstatements or omissions
in a registration statement filed with the SEC which has become effective. See Es-
cott v. Bar Chris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D:N.Y. 1968). Section 12 imposes
liability on those persons who offer to sell a security by means of a prospectus or
oral communications which includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits
to state a material fact. Section 18 imposes liability on any person who makes or
causes to be made any materially false or misleading statement in any application,
report or document filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act. See also SEC
Rule 2(e) permitting discipline and sanctions for errant accountants.
23. J. ABRAHAM, THE PuBLIc AcCOUNTING PROFESSION 131 (1978).
24. In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., (1940), reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,020 (1977).
25. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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ing"26 and political shock in the form of Watergate have prompted
further self-regulatory and legislative action-the former resulting
in Auditing Standards 16 and 17;27 the latter in the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)2&-in an attempt to regulate
unethical and/or illegal payments by United States companies,
both domestic and abroad. The FCPA imposes certain accounting
controls and prohibits payments of bribes by public and non-pub-
lic companies with both civil and criminal penalties for violations.
The effectiveness of these controls is certainly questionable, re-
flective perhaps only of governmental naivete, for arguably im-
plicit in accounting is the ability of the cost accountant to
rationally allocate these dishonest payments to a lawful cate-
gory.2 9 Because of this consideration and others,3 0 it is uncertain
whether Congress will be content to continue to permit account-
ancy self-regulation. In any event, regardless of the extent and
source of further regulation, the accounting profession will doubt-
less be affected by the results of individual cases litigated on a
common law basis in state courts throughout the country.31
26. "Equity Funding" refers to the activities of Equity Funding Corporation of
America and its subsidiaries which became the target of an SEC investigation,
criminal charges, and a variety of civil suits during the mid-'70's. It was alleged
the corporation engaged in various illegal and fraudulent practices designed to ar-
tificially inflate the market value of the corporation's securities, and that the cor-
porate accountants aided in concealing these facts. See generally In re Equity
Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
27. AICPA, supra note 12, AU § 327 (Auditing Standard 16: The Independent
Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities); id. AU § 328
(Auditing Standard 17: Illegal Acts of Clients). The enactment of these standards
was in response to the reaction that developed after the Watergate investigations
disclosed extensive evidence of illegal payments and other illegal corporate acts.
Chazen, Responsibilities of Auditors, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNuAL INsT-
TUTE ON SEcURTs LAWS & REGuLATIONS 107-08 (1977); see also Kapp, Some
Problems of a Legal Compliance Audit, 33 Bus. LAw. 2467 (1978).
28. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494-
95(1977) (amending § 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b) (Supp. 1980)).
29. See Hetherington, Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholders'
Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 232 n.157 (1979).
30. Problems inherent in self-regulation include the lack of a truly adversary
proceeding to generate conflicting viewpoints on the societal interests involved
and the possible appearances of impropriety when the professional is judged only
by his peers.
31. The effect of federal legislation upon the practice of accountancy and the
criminal and civil liability of the accountant under those laws is again outside the
scope of this article. The brief discussion of federal law is only to sensitize the
reader to considerations which may impact the resolution by state courts on the
policy question of duty and ultimate liability of the accountant for the breach of
that duty. Moreover, given the United States Supreme Court's current antipathy
241
ULTRAMARES: PROGENY AND DIsTANT RELATIVES
The impact of Ultramares on the development of the common
law of accountants' liability for negligent misrepresentation can-
not be overestimated. 32 Appearing somewhat of an aberration
even when it was decided by the highest New York state court
during its golden years,33 Ultramares has nevertheless withstood
the passage of time with remarkable vigor.
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,34 decided fifteen years
before Ultramares, Cardozo eliminated the requirement of privity
to permit the recovery of damages from a manufacturer where the
manufacturer's negligence caused personal injuries to third
persons:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger....
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb,
when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of con-
tract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it
ought to be. We have put its source in the law.
3 5
It is thus, according to Cardozo, the foresight of the consequences
and not the contractual relationship which creates the duty.3
6
Within a half-dozen years the same New York court in Glanzer
v. Shepard37 had occasion to consider the imposition of liability to
a third person not in privity where only intangible economic inter-
ests were involved. There, plaintiffs purchased bags of beans
from a company, payment for which was to be made in accord-
ance with the weight sheets certified by defendants, public weigh-
to private enforcement of the federal securities laws where "mere" negligence is
involved (see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)), state courts will
likely constitute the only available forum for a vast number of injured parties in
the foreseeable future.
32. The policy considerations expressed in Ultramares are, of course, not re-
stricted to the accountancy profession. The case itself or its rationale has been
used as the underpinning to limit liability for lawyers, abstracters, engineers, and
architects. See, e.g., Roady, Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VANm. L. REV.
783 (1959); Allen, Liabilities of Architects and Engineers to the Third Parties, 22
ARK. L. REV. 454 (1968); Reagan & Grossman, Liability of Third Parties for Eco-
nomic Injury: Privity as a Useful Animal or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw.
U. L. REV. 87 (1981).
33. See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
35. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1053.
36. In Cardozo's view, MacPherson was consistent with the settled law of New
York. The majority made clear they had no desire to return to the bastion of priv-
ity established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
217 N.Y. at 386, Ill N.E. at 1054. It is interesting to note, however, that although
Winterbottom's rationale was rejected (ie., the alleged absurdity of having an un-
limited class of plaintiffs), this same rationale, without reference to precedent, was
used by Cardozo in Ultramares to deny recovery. 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at
444.
37. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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ers. When plaintiffs discovered a shortfall in the weight of the
beans, they sued for the amount overpaid. In affirming the judg-
ment in plaintiffs' favor, Cardozo again explained "the law im-
poses a duty toward buyer as well as seller. The plaintiffs' use of
the certificates was not an indirect or collateral consequence of
the action of the weighers. It was a consequence which, to the
weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of the transaction."38
The Glanzer court attempted to minimize the effect of its decision
by referring first to MacPherson before going on to say "[t] here is
nothing new here in principle. If there is a novelty, it is the in-
stance only. One who follows a common calling may come under
a duty to another whom he serves, though a third may give the
order or make the payment."39 Illustrations of imposition of lia-
bility where the bill was paid by a third person include the negli-
gent doctor to his patient, the bailee careless in the receipt of
goods and the negligence by a searcher of title. "Constantly the
bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use."40
The obligation of defendants may not be stated merely in terms of
contract, "but of duty."41
With this precedential foundation it might readily have been
anticipated that only nine years later Utramares would have
been decided in a similar fashion. However, Cardozo's anxiety
over the implications of creating liability in an indeterminate sum
for an indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs was apparently
sufficient to deter him from extending liability on negligence
grounds, particularly where plaintiffs had redress for deceit.42 In
distinguishing Glanzer, he referred to the weigher's certificate
which was the "end and aim of the transaction,"43 contrasting that
with potential liability for those only incidentally or remotely in-
volved in the accountant-client relationship. Thus, even with the
recognition that "[t] he assault upon the citadel of privity is pro-
38. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
39. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
41. Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 277. Apparently not all courts were overwhelmed by
the wisdom of Cardozo. The appellate department of the Superior Court for Los
Angeles County rejected an appeal from the municipal court by a plaintiff for his
claim of $382. The court held a contractor could not recover against a civil engi-
neer who negligently prepared grading sheets which were known by him to be
used and relied upon by plaintiff. See Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 921,
229 P.2d 492 (1951).
42. 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
43. Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
ceeding in these days apace,"44 the Ultramares court in denying
recovery jumped from what they perceived to be the economically
devastating "slippery slope" of Glanzer and retreated to the safer
ground of privity.45
In light of this background and the development of tort law in
other areas, it would also have been reasonable to assume that
in the half-century since Ultramares, its privity doctrine would
have received a decent but final interment. How could it remain
alive in a legal environment which gave rise to Biakanja v. Irv-
ing,46 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.47 and Codling v.
Paglia ?48
In Biakanja, the California Supreme Court virtually abandoned
privity in holding a notary public who negligently failed to direct
proper attestation of a will could be liable in tort to an intended
beneficiary who suffered damage because of this oversight. Con-
cluding the will was the "end and aim of the transaction,"49 the
Biakanja court explained:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm.5 o
These factors, a synthesis from the work of both Prosser and
Harper and James,51 have been extensively relied on by Califor-
44. Id. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
45. The strength of Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares is certainly not enhanced
by his characterization of plaintiffs as only incidental to the transaction. The audit
of Stem's books not only was obviously intended for use by creditors, but it was
known by Touche that it would be used for that purpose. The fact that 32 copies of
the certified balance sheet were involved can hardly be said to be a mere coinci-
dence or indeterminate in size. Notwithstanding what appears to be the obvious
and recognized flaws in Ultramares, it remains comfortably ensconced as a legal
milestone. See Besser, supra note 3, at 515 n.33.
46. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
47. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
48. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
49. The Biakanja court relied on Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275
(1922), in reaching this conclusion. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19; see supra note
38 and accompanying text.
50. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. The criteria used in Biakanja have since
been applied to hold other professionals not in privity liable for negligence. See,
e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (lawyers);
Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977)
(architects); M. Miller Co. v. Davis & Morse, 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1961) (engineers).
51. The Biakanja court cited sections 36, 88 and 107 of W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955) and section 18.6 of 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
TORTS (1956). 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
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nia courts5 2 and courts of other jurisdictions53 as a generally ap-
plicable test for determining whether the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff.54
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. also discarded privity
in applying the concept of strict liability in tort to hold a manufac-
turer liable to third persons "when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for de-
fects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing."55 The Greenman rationale assumed there was no longer the
need to insulate a fledgling class of manufacturers when they
could readily spread the cost of the increased price of the product
amongst the consuming public.56 In Codling v. Paglia, the New
York high court joined California and other jurisdictions in hold-
ing a manufacturer of a defective product could be liable in tort to
any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial fac-
tor in bringing about the injury.5 7 Thus, even in the state of its
origin, privity was discarded as a technique to limit liability.
Nonetheless, old doctrines die hard. Ultramares was referred to
in a recent Georgia case 58 as stating the general rule of account-
ants' liability. "[I] n the absence of intentional misrepresentation
or fraud, an accountant is not liable for negligence to a third party
who is not in privity with the accountant."59 Although acknowl-
edging that Ultramares has been under attack, the Georgia court
saw no reason to depart from its rationale.60 Moreover, recent
cases from a variety of jurisdictions indicate that MacNerland is
not alone in its continued reliance on Ultramares.61
52. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804, 598 P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 410 (1979); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434,
551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976); Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 865, 447 P.2d 609, 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39, 42 (Alaska 1968); Fickett v. Supe-
rior Court of Pima County, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 795, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (1976); A.R.
Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 1973); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419
S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967); Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 387 F.
Supp. 772, 786 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (applying Tennessee law).
54. For a critique of the practical relevance of the Biakanja factors, see infra
text accompanying notes 110-11.
55. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
56. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
57. 32 N.Y.2d at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S. at 469.
58. MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 119 S.E.2d 564 (1973).
59. Id. at 370, 199 S.E.2d at 566.
60. Id. at 371.
61. See, e.g., Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir.
The fallout of Ultramares has not been limited to state courts.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,6 2 the United States Supreme
Court held that the negligence of an accounting firm was not suffi-
cient to give rise to a cause of action under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193463 and rule lOb-5. There the plain-
tiffs, customers of a brokerage firm, sued the traders' accountants
claiming the accountants had negligently failed to employ appro-
priate auditing procedures to uncover practices of the client con-
cealing fraud. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any
allegation of intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, no pri-
vate cause of action existed under the 1934 Act or the rule. Un-
willing to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct, the
Court cited Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores64 where it
had relied upon Ultramares in observing that
[w]hile much of the development of the law of deceit has been the elimi-
nation of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not the first
court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of
plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more
harm than good.65
Understandably, Hochfelder was received in certain quarters
with praise and sighs of relief because now the honest accountant
was insulated from civil liability. Injured third parties would not
only have to prove the audited financial statements contained a
material misrepresentation, but also that the action taken by the
public accountant with respect to those financial statements
demonstrated a wilful intent to "deceive" and "manipulate" the
ultimate users of those statements.66
1971); Investment Corp. of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968);
Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. Etc. v. Laventhold, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979); see also Koch Industries, Inc. v.
Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (applying Kansas law). Surprisingly, Koch
cites Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., 1964 A.C. 465, 1963 All E.R.
575, with approval. Hedley Byrne, however, decided the existence of a contract
was unnecessary for liability to third persons where the tortfeasor could reason-
ably foresee reliance on his conduct. The decision was based upon the comments
of Lord Denning in his dissent in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 Y.B.
164, [1951] 1 All E.R. 426. These decisions and the later case of Haig v. Bamford,
[1976] 3 W.W.R. 331, have been the subjects of considerable legal writing in Ca-
nada. See, e.g., Case Comment, Haig v. Bamford, 15 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 474 (1977);
Case Comment Haig v. Bamford, 42 SASK. L. REV. 147 (1977).
62. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (b) (1976).
64. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
65. Id. at 747-48, cited in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33
(1976).
66. See Comment, The Changing Legal Environment of Public Accounting:
Lower Court Applications of the Hochfelder Decision, 15 Am. Bus. L.J. 394 (1978).
The Hoch/elder opinion expressly left open the question of whether "reckless be-
havior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." 425 U.S. at 193
n.12 (emphasis added). Federal circuit courts subsequently considering the issue
have concluded that proof of recklessness will establish liability. See, e.g., G.A.
[VOL. 20: 233, 1983] Accountant Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The resiliency of Ultramares in certain state courts and its ef-
fect upon the United States Supreme Court in Hochfelder should
not be construed, however, as reflecting its invincibility. One line
of cases eschews the rigidity of Ultramares.67 The inroads, how-
ever, have generally been of a limited nature, lagging far behind
the development of tort law in other areas.
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects UZ-
tramares to the extent that privity is the sole definitional crite-
rion of duty. Nevertheless, the drafters felt comfortable traveling
only so far as the path was illuminated by the Glanzer principle
of "knowing reliance."68 And although rejecting privity, the expla-
nation of the Restatement's reasoning is more than reminiscent of
Cardozo's "slippery slope" prose in Ultramares:
69
When the harm that is caused is only pecuniary loss, the courts have
found it necessary to adopt a more restricted rule of liability, because of
the extent to which misinformation may be, and may be expected to be,
circulated, and the magnitude of the losses which may follow from reli-
ance upon it.
7 0
Where information is negligently supplied, the party supplying it
has liability where he fails to exercise reasonable care or compe-
tence in obtaining or communicating the information, except the
liability is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the re-
cipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transac-
tion that he intends the information to influence or knows that the
recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
7 1
Reasonable foreseeability, the hallmark of the negligence deter-
mination in other areas of tort law,7 2 is thus rejected as a stan-
dard for determining the accountant's liability for negligent
misrepresentation.
Courts taking issue with Ultramares, although sometimes
speaking in broader terms, have generally relied on the Restate-
Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Roll v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
67. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R. 3D 979 (1972).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
69. See supra text accompanying note 45.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
71. Id. § 552.
72. See id. §§ 284, 289, 291; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919-20,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-80 (1968).
ment standard in assessing the extent of the accountant's liabil-
ity. Recovery is limited to those situations in which the party
seeking recovery is "actually foreseen as a member of a limited
class of persons contemplated" 73 and one "for whose benefit and
guidance the accountant knows the information is intended."74
Courts using this analysis and finding liability focus on whether
the accountant knew the third party would rely upon the account-
ing statement.75 It is almost as if the slightest departure from U/-
tramares requires an apologia in order to prevent the irreparable
economic harm which will result in deviating from the holding.
A classic example of this phenomenon is provided by Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin,76 in which the federal district court ex-
pressed considerable doubt about the wisdom of Ultramares:
Why should an innocent party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an
accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily
distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession,
which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk on to its customers,
who can in turn pass the costs on to the entire consuming public? Finally,
wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the
accounting profession?7
7
Rusch Factors, however, sidestepped the broad policy inquiries it
posed and relied upon Glanzer under circumstances where the
accountant was aware the plaintiff Would be relying on the
financial statement. The test imposed was whether the third
party was "an actually foreseen member of a limited class."78 In
effect, in applying the Glanzer principle, the court followed the
Restatement.
A similar approach was utilized in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James7 9 in which the court discussed a liability standard based
on reasonable foreseeability.80 Although holding that "an account-
ant may be held liable to third parties who rely upon financial
73. Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 402 (Iowa 1969).
74. Id. at 403 (emphasis in original); see also Larsen v. United Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Iowa 1981).
75. Larsen v. United Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d at 286; Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir.
1971); Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 309-10 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); Merit Ins. Co. v. Colao,
603 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1979); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir.
1980); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 372 N.E.2d 315, 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474,
477 (1977).
76. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968).
77. Id. at 90-91. One commentator has provided a different perspective of the
Rusch Factors court's questions. That author views passing on the increased cost
as disastrous not only because the number of accountants will be reduced but be-
cause of the damage to the users and suppliers of capital. Comment, supra note 3,
at 707.
78. 284 F. Supp. at 91.
79. 466 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
80. Id. at 879.
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statements, audits, etc. prepared by the accountant in cases
where the latter fails to exercise ordinary care in the preparation
of such statements and audits, and the third party because of
such reliance suffers financial loss or damage,"8 ' the court
adopted the Restatement position in restricting the class of third
parties who could sue to those persons whom the accountant
knew were to rely on the certification of financial statements.82
The only case which moves beyond this carefully circumscribed
liability is AlumaCraft Manufacturing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.83
There the court was more expansive in attempting to define those
circumstances under which an accounting firm could be liable to a
third party not in privity. Although the complaint alleged the ac-
countant knew the audit was to be used and relied upon by the
plaintiff in order to set the price for shares of stock to be paid by
plaintiff, and after recognizing the Restatement's rejection of priv-
ity and its rejection in other cases, 84 the court held liability could
be imposed by balancing the factors referred to in Biakanja v. Ir-
ving.85 Except for this modest extension in a factual setting
where it was unnecessary to the holding, my research has not lo-
cated a reported case which allows recovery against a negligent
accountant when the plaintiff was only one of a foreseeable class
of persons.
ULTRAMARES: ITS TIME HAS PASSED
Why the development of the common law of accountant's liabil-
ity has proceeded so cautiously, in what is almost universally per-
ceived to be an activist judicial world, is inexplicable. Whatever
the reason, the decisional line continues to hover between Ul-
tramares and the Restatement. Clearly, the failure to move this
line forward cannot rest on the difference between economic in-
jury and physical injury. This distinction has long been blurred,86
81. Id. at 880.
82. Id.
83. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
84. In addition to the cases cited herein, the court also cited Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir.
1971).
85. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). The basic principle of
negligence liability in California is set out in CAI. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973),
which provides that every person is responsible for injuries caused by his or her
and properly so, particularly where the negligently prepared ac-
countant's certificate has been described as an instrument "for in-
flicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar."87
Reluctance to impose liability can also no longer be attributed
to the status of the accounting profession. There is no empirical
data to suggest the accounting profession has withered as a result
of increased liability. To the contrary, accountancy as a business
seems to have flourished. The fees charged by firms have risen
commensurate with the 'accountants' increased sophistication,
and the complexity and risk associated with their endeavors.88
As to the function of the audit itself there has indeed been a
considerable change since 1931 in the relationship between ac-
counting firms and third persons. At an earlier time the primary
responsibility of an auditor was to the owner of a business to re-
port on the operation of that business and to detect fraud and em-
bezzlement by the company's employees. However, as
businesses needed capital beyond what the owners could supply,
auditors were called upon to provide the lending and investing
public with independent opinions on how fairly financial state-
ments had been made. Likewise, the statutes administered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission reflect the belief that
dependable financial information is an essential prerequisite for
informed investment decisions. Today, the audit of public compa-
nies is largely for the benefit of third party users.89 The responsi-
bility of the public accountant
is not only to the client who pays his fee, but also to investors, creditors
and others who may rely on the financial statements which he certi-
fies.... The public accountant must report fairly on the facts as he finds
them whether favorable or unfavorable to his client. His duty is to safe-
guard the public interest, not that of his client.90
lack of ordinary care. That section and the cases interpreting it do not distinguish
between economic loss and physical injuries. Any suggestion to the contrary was
officially put to rest in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 806, 598 P.2d 60, 64,
157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1979).
87. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub.
nom., Howard v. United States, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
88. 'The accounting profession today needs little sympathy and should be
treated as any other business. Price, Waterhouse & Co., for example, earned gross
income in the United States of over $200 million in each of the five years [preced-
ing 1979]. Its worldwide revenue grew from nearly $400 million in 1975 to $635 mil-
lion in 1979." Comment, Accountant's Liability for Negligence: A Contemporary
Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FoRDHAm L. REV. 401, 413 n.75 (1980). In
fiscal 1981, three accounting firms in the "Big Eight" earned fees in excess of $900
million. Wayne, supra note 10.
89. See generally Wyatt, Auditor's Responsibilities, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331
(1968).
90. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting In the Mat-
ter of Touche, etc., 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957)).
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The accounting profession itself acknowledges its public
responsibility:
The ethical code of the American Institute emphasizes the profession's re-
sponsibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as the number of
investors has grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and
stockholders has become more impersonal, and as government increas-
ingly relies on accounting information.9 1
If the limitation of the accountant's liability is not based upon
the status of the profession, the function of the audit or the differ-
ence between economic loss and physical injuries, the reasons for
the rule must lie elsewhere.
The Restatement, like Ultramares, concludes "when there is no
intent to deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the
fault of the maker of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to
justify a narrower responsibility for its consequences." 92 Its ra-
tionale appears to rest on the reasonable expectations of the user
of the information. Because every user expects the information
to have been compiled honestly, he should have the right to sue
for fraud.93 But because any user cannot reasonably expect the
information to satisfy the terms of the obligations between the ac-
countant and his client unless that obligation were known to the
user, the user does not have the right to sue for negligence. The
Restatement in explaining its rule says
[b]y limiting the liability for negligence of a supplier of information to be
used in commercial transactions to cases in which he manifests an intent
to supply the information for the sort of use in which the plaintiff's loss
occurs, the law promotes the important social policy of encouraging the
flow of commercial information upon which the operation of the economy
rests. The limitation applies, however, only in the case of information sup-
plied in good faith, for no interest of society is served by promoting the
flow of information not genuinely believed by its maker to be true.9 4
The cogency of this delphic reasoning may be apparent to some.
Why, however, the limitation of liability will promote "the impor-
tant social policy of encouraging the flow of commercial informa-
tion upon which the operation of the economy rests" may not be
91. AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDAiDS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, ET
§ 51.04 (1982); see also Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to
Third Persons, 28 VAND. L REV. 31, 106 (1975); WINDAL & CORLEY, THE ACCOUNTInG
PROFEssIONu: Em cs, RESPONsmrrY AND inrry 27 (1980). But see THE Ac-
COUNTING ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 10, at 4.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
93. Honesty is described as requiring only "that the maker of a representation
speak in good faith and without consciousness of a lack of any basis for belief in
the truth or accuracy of what he says." Id.
94. Id.
clear to others. Following the Restatement, recovery against the
accountant rests solely upon chance considerations. Where A ne-
gotiates with X bank for $50,000 credit and the bank requires an
audit by independent public accountants, the accountants will be
liable only to X bank for a negligent misrepresentation. If fortui-
tously, A had decided to go to Y bank for credit, the accounting
firm would not be liable.95 The placing of liability on the fortui-
tousness of whether the name of the bank is disclosed or whether
a class of lending institutions were known to the accounting firm
may be a comfortable line to be drawn by those preparing the Re-
statement, but it does not appear to rest upon sound analytical
considerations. If the purpose of imposing liability is to increase
the flow of accurate information this hardly turns on the state of
mind of the accountant. Whether moral blame attaches to negli-
gent acts is also immaterial. The concept of negligence presumes
that a mistake could have been prevented through the use of rea-
sonable care. The incentive to convey accurate information in
commerce and prevent mistakes should not be diminished by the
good faith of the accountant nor by the scope of his initial conver-
sation with his client. Insulating the accountant from liability on
the basis of chance considerations with the likelihood of addi-
tional inaccurate information being disseminated should not
serve as the underpinning for a rule of liability.
The holding in Ultramares also rests on the assumption that
dire economic consequences will ensue if accounting firms bear
the loss sustained by investors or creditors when the accounting
data is negligently prepared. This alleged horrible, taken from a
parade of horribles, is a scene to which courts have given short
shrift in other areas. 96 Current literature contains no reasons nor
do any come to mind to support singling out the accounting pro-
fession for this type of preferential treatment.
Arguably, the limitation of accountants' liability should rest on
the fact that societal interests are better served by placing the
risk of loss for negligently prepared financial statements on those
persons who have either bargained for the risk or who are better
equipped to sustain that risk.97 This argument is based on the
reasoning that inherent in the risk-taking of the stock market or
95. See id. comment h, illustration 5.
96. In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
holding a lawyer could be liable to a third party not in privity, the court explained
that in some situations liability could be a large and unpredictable amount. "We
are of the view that the extension of his liability to beneficiaries injured by a negli-
gently drawn will does not place an undue burden on the profession, particularly
when we take into consideration that a contrary conclusion would cause the inno-
cent beneficiary to bear the loss." Id. at 589, 364 P.2d 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
97. This was one of appellant's arguments in U.S. Financial (see infra Appen-
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in extending credit is the real possibility that financial documents
of the company involved may be inaccurate because of the ac-
countant's good faith error. But this rationale is inconsistent with
general social policy considerations suggesting that risk of loss
should be imposed on the party best able to prevent its occur-
rence.98 Moreover, not all lenders and investors are of an institu-
tional specie, capable financially and in terms of expertise to
guard against the accountant's negligence. Nevertheless, few
would argue that the small plunger in the stock market should be
permitted recovery, but on identical facts, the institutional inves-
tor could be denied that right. A rule of liability should not fluctu-
ate depending upon the characterization of the plaintiff and the
frequency, size or type of his investment. These considerations
are better left to the broader concern of whether contributory or
comparative negligence should bar or limit a plaintiff's recovery.
The last remaining reason supporting Ultramares involves the
alleged difficulties which can arise when there is delay in bringing
suit. The phrase "indeterminate time"99 connotes an indefinite
and never-ending period within which an action may be brought.
This connotation infers prejudice to the defendant-accountant be-
cause of lapse of time. But the unfairness associated with time
and the rules pertaining to the accrual of causes of action until
discovery of the negligent act or the sustaining of damages are
not peculiar to actions brought against accountants. Where these
arguments were made against lawyers or doctors, they have
either been rejected 0 0 or corrected by legislation.101
THE FORESEEABLE HARM STANDARD APPLIED
TO AccOUNTANT LIABn=r
Assuming merit in the rejection of the reasons supporting Ul-
tramares, what tort analysis for determining the liability of the
dix). The thoughtful literature on this subject does not suggest this as a valid rea-
son to support a limitation of liability.
98. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d
473, 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 126 (1982).
99. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 171-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931); see
supra text accompanying note 7.
100. See, e.g., Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201, 491 P.2d 433, 436-37, 98 Cal. Rptr.
849, 852-53 (1971).
101. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. Paoc. CODE § 340.6 (West Supp. 1982) (lawyers); CAL.
Cry. Ploc. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1982) (doctors).
accountant for negligent misrepresentation should be made? Tra-
ditionally, the starting point for analyzing this question has been
the same as analyzing liability in other areas: was there a duty
between the accountant and the party claiming pecuniary loss?
But what is really meant by duty? And how meaningful are the
criteria listed in Biakanja v. Irving=o2 in aiding this inquiry? Isn't
there a simpler and more direct approach to this entire question?
Initially, it must be recognized that the question of whether one
owes a legal "duty" to another such as to give rise to tort liability
for breach of that duty is not really a question at all. It is instead
"a shorthand statement of a conclusion ... [It is only an expres-
sion] of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection." 0 3
The question of tort liability is more accurately analyzed when
the word "duty" is eliminated, with the focus solely on the issue
of whether there should be liability. It is certainly discomforting
to think that it is in the best interest of society to conclude that
where there is no "duty" an individual may act negligently.3O4 Not
only is it consistent with one's moral responsibilities in a pluralis-
tic and democratic society to recognize that each of us owes a
duty to all others to refrain from acting negligently, but a tort
analysis which accepts this concept as underlying a rule of liabil-
ity has the virtue of simplicity.105 Policy considerations properly
limiting liability may then be sharply defined and examined.
Inherent in the tort negligence recovery system is the balancing
of costs which society deems important.106 When some parties
are required to bear the financial loss which they have caused to
others, not only is this thought to be a fair result in moral terms,
102. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text
103. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (3d ed. 1964), quoted in
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968); see
also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
104. One would presume we have moved beyond the belief that "a man is enti-
tled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to
them." LeLievre v. Gould, f 1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 497.
105. This approach is generally consistent with California law. In Rowland v.
Christian, relying on the general statement of negligence liability embodied in
CAL. CMv. CODE § 1714 (West 1973), there is a presumption of liability dispensed
with only in exceptional circumstances when required by public policy. 69 Cal. 2d
108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 CaL Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
106. The importance of balancing costs is more obvious in some cases and not
others. For example, in denying recovery to a child for loss of a parent's consor-
tium, the California Supreme Court said "[t]he payment of damages to persons
for the lost affection and society of a parent or child neither truly compensates for
such loss or justifies the social cost in attempting to do so." Borer v. American
Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 444, 563 P.2d 858, 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1977).
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but presumably beneficial adjustments occur in the marketplace
of behavior and commerce. Accordingly, if the general rule of lia-
bility is to be abrogated in favor of accountants, it would seem
justified only if there is some external social cause not accounted
for in the usual cost balancing system which underlies recovery
for negligence.
As noted previously, 0 7 the California Supreme Court in
Biakanja v. Irving synthesized a set of factors to use in determin-
ing whether the general rule of liability for injury caused by negli-
gence0 8 should be dispensed with in a particular instance.109 To
recapitulate, the Biakanja court considered
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the
foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf-
fered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's con-
duct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.1 1 0
Unfortunately, when examined closely, these factors add little or
nothing to the question of whether accountants should have a dif-
ferent rule of tort liability.
The "foreseeability of the harm" and "the policy of preventing
future harm" are considerations already factored into a tradi-
tional negligence determination. There is no need for a court to
restrict liability on these bases as a matter of law unless there is
insufficient evidence from which a jury could find the defendant
negligent."' The "closeness of the connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injuries suffered" is generally a ques-
tion of fact for the jury normally considered under a causation
rubric.112 Again, there seems little reason to remove this decision
from the jury absent insufficiency of evidence. The "extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff" would
appear to be relevant only in that it affects the foreseeability of
the harm, a factor already considered. It is unclear how "the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct" would justify a
107. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
108. See supra note 105.
109. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); see also Row-
land v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
110. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
111. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468, 471 (1975).
112. But see Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 220-21, 157 P.2d 372, 376
(1945) (Traynor, J., concurring).
restriction of liability unless defendant's "morality" was in some
sense due to relevant but unarticulated policy considerations.
Among the Biakanja factors, the only one which might justify a
departure from the general rule of liability involves "the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury." Were a case to arise
where the difficulties in proving an injury were so severe as to
make the jurors' determination necessarily speculative, courts
might be justified in restricting defendant's liability for such in-
jury. In our context, however, this is largely a theoretical prob-
lem. No one has suggested any difficulty in proving the fact of
injury when an accountant's negligence is involved.
This is not to say, however, that public policy considerations do
not exist which justify a departure from the principle of general
liability. On occasions, noncompensability of an injury might be a
reason.113 The systemic costs associated with public officials de-
fending against tort suits brought as a result of their discretionary
acts is another.114 Governmental immunity or public official im-
munity is merely a iestriction on liability based on external pub-
lic policy concerns, but again it is preferable to appreciate that
the absence of liability in these cases is because of public policy
concerns and not because a public official owes no "duty" to per-
sons who may have been harmed because of his negligence.
In summary, imposition of liability for injury caused by an indi-
vidual or institution's negligence serves important societal objec-
tives not only in compensating the injured party but also in
providing a financial disincentive for socially unreasonable con-
duct. These important objectives are not to be dispensed with
lightly. The general rule of liability for negligence should be lim-
ited only where social policy considerations not already part of
the negligence determination itself outweigh the need for com-
pensation and behavior modification. The reasons which have
been advanced in support of restricting accountants' liability sim-
ply fail to overcome this substantial burden. Accordingly, the
time has come to confront the inquiry of Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levinl15 and acknowledge that the liability of the accountant
should be determined on the basis of foreseeability. Foreseeabil-
ity of the risk would be a question of fact for the jury to be dis-
turbed on appeal only where there is insufficient evidence to
113. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 862,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977).
114. See Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1958); Kilgore v. Younger, 30 Cal. 3d
770, 782, 640 P.2d 793, 800, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (1982).
115. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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support that finding."16
There are some who might question or criticize this simplistic
conclusion for its apparent failure to have given sufficient weight
to the burden upon the courts in what inevitably will be complex
and costly trials in which the narrow issue will be the account-
ant's technical failure to have placed the accounting data in
proper categories. The essence of this argument is that since ac-
countancy may be more of an art than a science, liability is more
properly limited to cases of gross misconduct rather than negli-
gence." 7 Without giving short shrift to this argument, it should
be sufficient to respond by asking in what other areas of the law
do we trade off actual damages resulting from negligence on the
basis of the combined expense of judicial administration and cost
to the parties.
Added expense of litigation to the damaged party is always an
additional voluntary expenditure which presumably is incurred
only after the likelihood of litigation success has been carefully
explored. The accountant's added burden of further costs of liti-
gation is only improper if there is a distinct reason why the ac-
countant should be accorded treatment preferential to that
received by other classes of potential defendants. If the difficulty
and expense of establishing liability were to be the basis for im-
munizing classes of persons, that classification is clearly best left
to the legislature which could weigh not only the cost benefit fac-
tors, but the relevant moral considerations. The legislature could
then deal with the contention that because of the theoretical pos-
sibility that accountants could negligently create enormously
complex and costly fact-unraveling trials, they should be relieved
of liability for the damages which they have caused. Obviously,
taken to its logical end, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and so forth,
could also be relieved of liability. Although the legislative re-
116. See Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975).
117. Where the accountant believes he is professionally obligated to qualify his
opinion, he should do so. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18. The discus-
sion of liability in this paper has proceeded on the premise that the accountant
has certified his audit and given an unqualified opinion that the financial state-
ments fairly present financial position, results of operations and changes in
financial position in conformity with GAAP consistently applied. Whether the ele-
ment of reasonable reliance could ever be established in those cases where the
company issuing the financial statement would itself qualify that statement by ex-
pressing an opinion that the statement may have been negligently prepared is be-
yond the scope of this paper.
sponse is always an unknown, it would hardly appear that any
legislature would be sympathetic to this argument. In the ab-
sence of legislation, such a judicially-created rule would appear to
be demeaning to the fact-finding capability of juries and contrary
to the concept of justice underlying our tort recovery system.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this argument-the com-
plexities of the principles of accounting practice should give ac-
countants some leeway to avoid liability for errors-is directed
not to the scope of the accountant's duty but towards a general
rule of immunity. As such, it proves too much. No one has sug-
gested that the negligent accountant not be liable as against the
party with whom he contracted, but only that the scope of per-
sons given legal protection against his negligence be limited. Al-
though the issues of duty and liability are necessarily
intertwined, elimination of liability by creating immunity neces-
sarily emasculates any discussion of duty.
There is some admitted discomfort in saddling the "merely"
negligent accountant with economic responsibility for the fraud
and dishonesty of the corporate manager. But again, to permit
viscerally discomforting responses to control analytical considera-
tions is wholly inappropriate. Tort law traditionally has
subordinated these moral considerations to pragmatic concern
with foreseeability. It must be remembered that one of the spe-
cific functions for which the accountant is employed is the detec-
tion of corporate fraud. Accountants and accounting firms derive
substantial economic benefit because of their abilities in this re-
gard. It hardly seems oppressive to require that they perform this
task in a professionally reasonable manner. 18 The moral imbal-
ance between the accountant's negligence and the corporate man-
ager's fraud-ignored in establishing liability vis-A-vis the
foreseeable plaintiff-is considered in the context of indemnifica-
tion among defendants where adjustment in terms of primary or
secondary liability can occur. Thus, where liability is assessed
against two or more parties with different degrees of responsibil-
ity, indemnification permits the party less culpable to be reim-
bursed.1 9 Inevitably, however, unfairness results in every case
where the truly culpable party is insolvent. The legal solution,
however, is not to insulate the one party at fault and thereby de-
118. Just as a third person's reliance on a physician's negligent diagnosis of a
patient's physical condition is reasonably foreseeable, Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1980), so too is a
third person's reliance on the accountant's negligent diagnosis of the corporation's
financial condition.
119. See generally American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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prive the injured party of redress. When imperfect justice is com-
pared with no justice at all, the law generally will select the
former as being the lesser of two evils.
CONCLUSION
The certified public accountant occupies a critical position in
the investment and financial community. As the corporate sec-
tor's need to generate business capital continues to increase, so
too does the importance of accounting services as the major if not
only way to efficiently compile and communicate relevant
financial information which serves as the basis for investment de-
cisions. This increase in importance can be defined not only in
dollar terms but also in terms of the sheer number of persons and
institutions who receive and, as a practical matter, must rely on
the accountant's product. When such product is materially in er-
ror, investment decisions are skewed which ultimately has ad-
verse effects on the operation of the economy as a whole. More
immediately, investors of every size and type suffer significant
financial injury as a result of their reliance on the accountant's
representations.
The analysis in this article has attempted to demonstrate the
social fallacy in retaining the Ultramares privity requirement or
the Restatement's "actual knowledge" test as the standard for de-
fining the scope of the accountant's liability for negligent misrep-
resentation. The alternative suggestion-negligence based on the
foreseeability of injury-is really nothing new at all but rather the
same economically sound standard applied to negligence liability
in virtually every other context. The reasons advanced in support
of the Ultramares and Restatement position provide no persuasive
rationale for treating accountants differently from any other po-
tential defendants whose negligence causes injury.
Justice Tobriner's landmark opinion for the California Supreme
Court in Dillon v. Legg120 exposed the artificiality of judicial de-
terminations that defendants owe no "duty" to plaintiffs:
The history of the concept of duty in itself discloses that it is not an old
and deep-rooted doctrine but a legal device of the latter half of the nine-
teenth century designed to curtail the feared propensities of juries toward
liberal awards. "It must not be forgotten that 'duty' got into our law for
the very purpose of combatting what was then feared to be a dangerous
delusion (perhaps especially prevalent among juries imbued with popular
120. 68 CaL 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
notions of fairness untempered by paramount judicial policy), viz., that
the law might countenance legal redress for all foreseeable harm."
12 1
The time has come to absolve the negligent accountant of this
anachronistic protection. Accountant liability based on foresee-
able injury would serve the dual functions of compensation for in-
jury and deterrence of negligent conduct. Moreover, it is just and
rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the imposi-
tion of negligence liability, regardless of the context in which it
arises. The accountant, the investor and the general public will in
the long run benefit when the liability of the certified public ac-
countant for negligent misrepresentation is measured by the fore-
seeability standard.
121. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (quoting J. FLEMING, AN INro-
DUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 47 (1967)).
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APPENDIX
The story of the rise and fall of U.S. Financial (USF) is fascinat-
ing reading for those curious as to the whys and wherefores of
corporate success and failure. A succinct summary of some of the
reasons for USF's financial debacle may be gleaned from the 138-
page, 66-count federal indictment dated December 30, 1974122 in
which a number of persons including certain officers and direc-
tors of USF were named as principals in the conspiracy to de-
fraud the public by inflating the value of USF's traded stock, and
also by reference to the voluminous bankruptcy files which reveal
that in 1977, when the financial position of USF was finally unrav-
eled, it had $202,050,000 in claims and an estimated $45,000,000 in
assets. The one chapter in the USF saga which will be described
in greater detail is that dealing with the claims of two groups of
creditors who established to the satisfaction of a jury and judge
that because of the negligent misrepresentations of Touche they
were damaged in the sum of approximately $22,700,000.123
One group of plaintiff creditors, Senior Noteholders, bought
$18,000,000 of USF twelve to fifteen-year notes in 1968-1969 under
written purchase agreements which required USF to maintain its
accounting in accord with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, to furnish financial statements "accompanied by an opinion
of independent certified public accountants of recognized national
standing" and to furnish annually a certificate that there had
been no default and USF had complied with the debt limitations
of the agreements.124 One of the circumstances permitting the ac-
celeration of these notes was false representations by or on be-
half of the company. These creditors presented sufficient
evidence to satisfy the jury that not only would they have acceler-
ated the notes, but they would have successfully collected them
had they not remained passive relying upon Touche's 1970 audit
122. Filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of California,
San Diego, California.
123. The discrepancy between the total judgment of $28,800,000 (see supra text
at note 1) and this sum is that the facts which will be discussed omit another
group of creditors. As stated earlier, the reason for discussing the facts is only to
add life to what otherwise is a sterile problem. The type of financial event causing
damage to a third person relying upon the auditor's statement is only limited by
one's imagination. Any legal solution should be sufficiently encompassing to cover
any occurrence as unique as that occurrence might be.
124. Touche conceded it owed a duty of care to this category of plaintiffs.
and unqualified opinion of USF's financial affairs.125
The other groups of plaintiffs, Deltec Noteholders, were primar-
fly foreign banks who purchased about $11,500,000 in USF's short-
term notes from Deltec Banking Corporation, Ltd., a merchant
bank and underwriter of private placement securities. In ques-
tion were three groups of notes with maturity dates of March 15,
1973, May 8, 1973, and May 17, 1973, which were bought between
December 15, 1971 and June 30, 1972. They were issued by U.S. Fi-
nancial Overseas N.V., a wholly-owned subsidiary of USF, and
were guaranteed by USF. As part of the agreement of December
13, 1971 between Deltec and USF, USF delivered to the lenders a
balance sheet audited as of December 31, 1970, and the unaudited
statements as of September 30, 1971, both prepared "in accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting practices and princi-
ples." The borrowers and guarantor both covenanted to follow
generally accepted accounting principles in keeping their books
and to give Deltec a certified consolidated balance sheet at the
end of each fiscal year. At trial, these plaintiffs also prevailed
proving they never would have bought the notes had the 1970 au-
dit and opinion revealed the true financial situation of USF or, in
the alternative, they would have called their loans had the facts
been known early enough to save their investments.26
The foregoing facts depict just two of the innumerable situa-
tions leading to liability for the negligent accounting firm. Admit-
tedly, the result is somewhat paradoxical. Here, Touche was
found responsible to creditors who retained notes in reliance
upon the negligent audit as well as creditors who purchased notes
based upon the same audit. The former were damaged because
had they accelerated the notes they could have collected on them;
125. Implicit in this narration is Touche's negligence in the audit of USF. Also
implicit is the nature and extent of USF's fraud. USF's not-so-original scam was to
inflate income in order to increase the value of its traded stock. This was effected
through the illusion that USF had actually sold large parcels of developed or par-
tially developed real estate at a profit when in fact the sales had not occurred.
Straw men and shell corporations created and financed by USF were used as pur-
chasers to legitimize what were truly paper transactions. The accountants negli-
gently failed to catch the artificiality of at least two such transactions resulting in
a material variance, more than 10 percent, in the certified financial statements. A
full discussion of the specific transactions involved and the order of the Securities
& Exchange Commission imposing remedial sanctions against Touche appear in
Accounting Series Release No. 153, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,175 (1977).
126. The trial court rejected the application of Ultramares and left to the jury
whether under the circumstances Touche's lack of ordinary care caused a foresee-
able injury to the economic interests of plaintiffs. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24
Cal. 3d 799, 803-06, 598 P.2d 60, 62-64, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409-11 (1979).
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the latter were damaged because the notes purchased were found
to be worthless.127
127. The result holding the accountants fully liable for all damages to the pre-
vailing plaintiffs is yet another facet of the problem of the accountant's liability.
Assuming a duty absent privity to third parties, should the burden of proof of reli-
ance on the negligently prepared statement be increased to a clear and convincing
standard, or should damages be determined by the fair market value of the paper
(notes) at the time of the purchase? Analysis of these and similar questions, al-
though relevant to the ultimate effect upon the accountant who may be liable for
negligent misrepresentation, is outside the scope of this paper.

